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7958c928fb
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2020-07/msg00034.html
Fixes the following security issues:
* CVE-2020-10713
A flaw was found in grub2, prior to version 2.06. An attacker may
use the GRUB 2 flaw to hijack and tamper the GRUB verification
process. This flaw also allows the bypass of Secure Boot
protections. In order to load an untrusted or modified kernel, an
attacker would first need to establish access to the system such as
gaining physical access, obtain the ability to alter a pxe-boot
network, or have remote access to a networked system with root
access. With this access, an attacker could then craft a string to
cause a buffer overflow by injecting a malicious payload that leads
to arbitrary code execution within GRUB. The highest threat from
this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well
as system availability.
* CVE-2020-14308
In grub2 versions before 2.06 the grub memory allocator doesn't
check for possible arithmetic overflows on the requested allocation
size. This leads the function to return invalid memory allocations
which can be further used to cause possible integrity,
confidentiality and availability impacts during the boot process.
* CVE-2020-14309
There's an issue with grub2 in all versions before 2.06 when
handling squashfs filesystems containing a symbolic link with name
length of UINT32 bytes in size. The name size leads to an
arithmetic overflow leading to a zero-size allocation further
causing a heap-based buffer overflow with attacker controlled data.
* CVE-2020-14310
An integer overflow in read_section_from_string may lead to a heap
based buffer overflow.
* CVE-2020-14311
An integer overflow in grub_ext2_read_link may lead to a heap-based
buffer overflow.
* CVE-2020-15706
GRUB2 contains a race condition in grub_script_function_create()
leading to a use-after-free vulnerability which can be triggered by
redefining a function whilst the same function is already
executing, leading to arbitrary code execution and secure boot
restriction bypass
* CVE-2020-15707
Integer overflows were discovered in the functions grub_cmd_initrd
and grub_initrd_init in the efilinux component of GRUB2, as shipped
in Debian, Red Hat, and Ubuntu (the functionality is not included
in GRUB2 upstream), leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. These
could be triggered by an extremely large number of arguments to the
initrd command on 32-bit architectures, or a crafted filesystem
with very large files on any architecture. An attacker could use
this to execute arbitrary code and bypass UEFI Secure Boot
restrictions. This issue affects GRUB2 version 2.04 and prior
versions.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2f7a8021b5)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
117 lines
3.4 KiB
Diff
117 lines
3.4 KiB
Diff
From a1845e90fc19fb5e904091bad8a378f458798e4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2020 15:48:20 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH] lvm: Fix two more potential data-dependent alloc
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overflows
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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It appears to be possible to make a (possibly invalid) lvm PV with
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a metadata size field that overflows our type when adding it to the
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address we've allocated. Even if it doesn't, it may be possible to do so
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with the math using the outcome of that as an operand. Check them both.
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
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---
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grub-core/disk/lvm.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
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1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
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index d1df640b3..139fafd47 100644
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--- a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
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+++ b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c
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@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
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#include <grub/lvm.h>
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#include <grub/partition.h>
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#include <grub/i18n.h>
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+#include <grub/safemath.h>
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#ifdef GRUB_UTIL
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#include <grub/emu/misc.h>
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@@ -102,10 +103,11 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
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{
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grub_err_t err;
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grub_uint64_t mda_offset, mda_size;
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+ grub_size_t ptr;
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char buf[GRUB_LVM_LABEL_SIZE];
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char vg_id[GRUB_LVM_ID_STRLEN+1];
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char pv_id[GRUB_LVM_ID_STRLEN+1];
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- char *metadatabuf, *p, *q, *vgname;
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+ char *metadatabuf, *p, *q, *mda_end, *vgname;
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struct grub_lvm_label_header *lh = (struct grub_lvm_label_header *) buf;
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struct grub_lvm_pv_header *pvh;
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struct grub_lvm_disk_locn *dlocn;
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@@ -205,19 +207,31 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
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grub_le_to_cpu64 (rlocn->size) -
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grub_le_to_cpu64 (mdah->size));
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}
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- p = q = metadatabuf + grub_le_to_cpu64 (rlocn->offset);
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- while (*q != ' ' && q < metadatabuf + mda_size)
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- q++;
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-
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- if (q == metadatabuf + mda_size)
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+ if (grub_add ((grub_size_t)metadatabuf,
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+ (grub_size_t)grub_le_to_cpu64 (rlocn->offset),
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+ &ptr))
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{
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+ error_parsing_metadata:
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#ifdef GRUB_UTIL
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grub_util_info ("error parsing metadata");
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#endif
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goto fail2;
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}
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+ p = q = (char *)ptr;
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+
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+ if (grub_add ((grub_size_t)metadatabuf, (grub_size_t)mda_size, &ptr))
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+ goto error_parsing_metadata;
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+
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+ mda_end = (char *)ptr;
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+
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+ while (*q != ' ' && q < mda_end)
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+ q++;
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+
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+ if (q == mda_end)
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+ goto error_parsing_metadata;
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+
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vgname_len = q - p;
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vgname = grub_malloc (vgname_len + 1);
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if (!vgname)
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@@ -367,8 +381,26 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk,
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{
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const char *iptr;
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char *optr;
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- lv->fullname = grub_malloc (sizeof ("lvm/") - 1 + 2 * vgname_len
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- + 1 + 2 * s + 1);
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+
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+ /*
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+ * This is kind of hard to read with our safe (but rather
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+ * baroque) math primatives, but it boils down to:
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+ *
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+ * sz0 = vgname_len * 2 + 1 +
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+ * s * 2 + 1 +
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+ * sizeof ("lvm/") - 1;
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+ */
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+ grub_size_t sz0 = vgname_len, sz1 = s;
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+
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+ if (grub_mul (sz0, 2, &sz0) ||
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+ grub_add (sz0, 1, &sz0) ||
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+ grub_mul (sz1, 2, &sz1) ||
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+ grub_add (sz1, 1, &sz1) ||
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+ grub_add (sz0, sz1, &sz0) ||
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+ grub_add (sz0, sizeof ("lvm/") - 1, &sz0))
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+ goto lvs_fail;
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+
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+ lv->fullname = grub_malloc (sz0);
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if (!lv->fullname)
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goto lvs_fail;
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--
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2.26.2
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